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UNFAIR COMPETITION BY FALSE STATEMENTS
OR DISPARAGEMENT
HARRY D. NIMst
The International Association for the Protection of Industrial
Property, at its convention in London, in May, 1932, considered a
proposal to amend its definition of unfair competition to read: "i.
Every act of whatever nature to create confusion by any means,
with the establishments, the services, or the products of a com-
petitor. 2. Statements in the course of commerce of a nature to dis:
credit the establishments, the services, or the products of a com-
petitor. 3. False allegations made in the course of commerce of a
nature to attract trade and which have to do with the origin, the
nature, the manufacture, the sale of products, or the reputation
of the commercial establishment, or industrial benefits."
Such recommendations are reminders of the importance of a
questidn which has been under discussion for some years, i. e. whether
the rules of unfair competition law comprehend false, unfair, or
defamatory statements concerning a competitor or his goods or his
business methods.
In 1916 Dean Pound, in an article entitled "Equitable Relief
against Defamation and Injuries to Personality",' reviewed the lead-
ing cases involving disparagement of goods, and then wrote in con-
clusion:
"Looking back over these cases of injury to person or property by
writing and publishing, we see that the English Courts now deal with
them as with any other torts; that in England the subject has had the
very same development as equity jurisdiction over trespass, over
disturbance of easements, and over nuisance. We also see that
American Courts are moving in the same direction, reaching such
cases indirectly by laying hold of some admitted head of equity
jurisdiction and tacking thereto what is in substance concurrent juris-
diction over legal injuries through publication. In some of the cases
this is so obviously but a matter of pleading that we may be con-
fident some strong court presently will take the direct course and will
be followed therein. Most of the cases that grant relief speak strongly
of the injustice that must result from denial of jurisdiction in these
cases. In substance, the traditional doctrine puts anyone's business
at the mercy of any insolvent, malicious defamer who has sufficient
tMember of the New York bar; author of UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE
MARKS (3rd. ed. 1929). 1(1916) 2g HARv. L. REv. 640.
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imagination to lay out a skillful campaign of extortion. So long as
denial of relief in such cases rests on no stronger basis than authority
our courts are sure to find a way out."'2
In the sixteen years since this was written apparently no "strong
court" has been willing to "take the direct course", but some of our
courts have further cleared the way for an outright declaration that
defamation or disparagement of a competitor's goods is unfair com-
petition and a proper subject of injunctive relief.
The nearest approach is that made by the New York courts. In
1928 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court de-
cided Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith,3 a suit between competitors. "The
defendant in 1921 instituted a campaign of false disparagement
against the plaintiff's goods which he has continued to conduct.
Salesmen were instructed to make false statements as to the efficacy
of 'So-Bos-So'," (plaintiff's product), "to tell prospective purchasers
that they could be fined for selling it, and that any of the 'So-Bos-So'
product which they had on hand was subject to seizure by inspectors
of the United States government. The defendant even caused to be
printed two spurious documents, one purporting to be a bulletin of
information about fly sprays, and the other containing analyses of fly
sprays. Each dealt severally with 'So-Bos-So'. Each fraudulently
represented on its face that it was an official document of the United
States Department of Agriculture."
Passing off and trade-mark infringement also were charged, and
the Appellate Court denied relief as to both. Nevertheless it sus-
tained the judgment of the court below "enjoining the practice of
false disparagement of plaintiff's product". Judge Sears, in his
opinion for the Appellate Division, noted the fact that "Actions for
unfair competition are not now confined to 'passing off' cases", and
then distinguished the leading New York cases on disparagement of
goods, 4 saying that these were "not cases of unfair competition but
suits against the publishers of libels". This may be intended as a
ruling that when the libel is published by a competitor it is unfair
competition and may be enjoined-a radical departure from the de-
cision in Mauger v. Dick,' which Judge Sears cites on the New York
TPound, supra note i, at 668.
3224 App. Div. 187, 190,229 N. Y. Supp. 692, 696 (4th Dept. 1928).
4Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 24 (1839) and Marlin Fire Arms Co. v.
Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902).
655 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 132 (1878). Soon after Mauger had left Dick's employ
and started a competing business, Dick issued a circular stating "certain parties
are infringing our trademark rights", and threatening to punish "any encroach-
ments on our rights". It was held that "the jurisdiction of a court of equity does
UNFAIR COMPETITION BY DISPARAGEMENT 65
law, but does not attempt to distinguish. It is a departure, too, from
such precedents as Kidd v. Horry; Baltimore Car Wheel Company v.
Bemis,7 Citizens' Light, Heat and P. Co. v. Montgomery;8 Finnish
Temperance Soc. v. Rawaaja Pub. Co.;9 Whitehead v. Kitson;10 Con-
sumers' Gas Co. v. E. C. 0. K. C. Gaslight & Cola Co.," all of which are
actions against competitors, where injunctive relief was denied on the
ground that equity may not enjoin a libel. Furthermore, this de-
cision is a step ahead of the cases in which injunctive relief against
trade libels has been granted as incidental to relief from other acts
such as boycott and conspiracy,2 charges of patent infringement and
threats of litigation made not in good faith but to intimidate and
not extend to false representations as to the character or quality of the plaintiff's
property, or to his title thereto, when it involves no breach of trust or contract,
nor does it extend to cases of libel or slander", and the complaint was dismissed.
628 Fed. 773 (E. D. Pa. I886). This was the first application by a federal
court of the rule against injunctive restraint of a libel, in a suit involving dis-
paragement of a competitor's goods. In Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Manu-
facturing Co., 114 Mass. 69 (1873), an injunction restraining defendant from
representing to plaintiff's customers that plaintiff's goods infringed defendant's
patents was refused on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery
over cases of libel and slander or of false representations as to plaintiff's property.
729 Fed. 95 (C. C. Mass. 1866), which cited and followed Kidd v. Horry and
Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., supra note 6.
817- Fed. 553, 563 (N. D. Ala. igog). Here the court held that there were
"constitutional difficulties in the way of suppressing the injury resulting either
from circulation of defamation, or of lawful solicitation of customers." Plaintiff
had argued that the court had the power to interfere by injunction "because in so
doing it would be enforcing the policy of the Constitution and prevent the ac-
complishment by one competitor of an avowed and undoubted purpose, by means
fair or foul, to drive his rival to the wall, and thus defeat the very purpose of the
Constitution in securing 'reasonable competition' ".
'219 Mass. 28, 29, xo6 N. E. 561, 562 (i914), where it was held that "It is
settled by our decisions that where no breach of trust or of contract appears, a bill
in equity will not lie to enjoin the publication of libelous statements injurious to
the plaintiff's business, trade or profession, or which operate as a slander of his
title to property."
10119 Mass. 484 (1876), citing and following Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence
Manufacturing Co., supra note 6.
"Ioo Mo. 501, 13 S. W. 874 (18go), also following Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence
Manufacturing Co., supra note 6.
'
2Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 48, 3 Sup. Ct. 492 (1911);
Loewe v. Lawlor, 2o8 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 3O (19o8); Chamber of Commerce v.
Federal Trade, Commission, 13 F. (2d) 673, 684 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). A note
on this last case in 12 IowA L. REV., 77, 78 (1926), refers to the "dictum" that
equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin a libel. "In most cases of threatened tort to
property interests preventive relief is now available, yet, where unrestrained
publication may cause irreparable injury, and where the legal remedy is totally
inadequate, equity denies relief for largely historical reasons."
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coerce customers of plaintiff 1 3 or misrepresentations as to the scope of
a decree.1 4
In Old hInvestors & Traders Corp. v. Jenkins,15 a few months after
the decision of Allen v. Smith, the New York Supreme Court refused
to dismiss a complaint which alleged publication of circulars con-
taining false statements intended to injure the plaintiff in its business
and prayed for an injunction to restrain the publication of another
such circular. The Appellate Division affirmed the decree.16 Here
the plaintiff and one defendant were dealers in stocks and bonds; a
second defendant published the circular entitled "Bowen's Confi-
dential Service, Financial Investigations and Reports". The dis-
tributor of the circular, who was a competitor of the plaintiff, and the
publisher, who was not, both were enjoined. In his opinion, Judge
Peters distinguished the case from the Marlin case,17 on the ground
that there was "much more involved in this case than the mere pub-
lishing of a libel". He said:
"The complaint is based on the theory of unfair trade competition.
The mailing or sending of false, untrue and dishonest statements
to the customers of an established firm, for the purpose of injuring the
firm in its business and deceiving the public and plaintiff's customers,
is a form of unfair trade competition which can be as injurious as the
establishment of 'a competitor in the neighborhood using the same or a
similar name.and circularizing the firm's customers for the purpose of
confusing them and obtaining their patronage."'I8
Now, as formerly, trade libels frequently are enjoined in cases in
which they are considered with acts that come under "some admitted
head of equity jurisdiction", 19 but in such cases the language of the
courts indicates an increasing willingness to recognize the need for
adequate relief from disparagement of goods by a competitor. In
13Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46 (N. D. Ill. I888); A. B. Farquhar Co. v. National
Harrow Co., io2 Fed. 714 (C. C. A. 3rd, i9oo); Electric Renovator Mfg. Co. v.
Vacuum Cleaner Co., 189 Fed. 754 (W. D. Pa. 19i); Atlas Underwear Co.
v. Cooper Underwear Co., 21o Fed. 347 (E. D. Wis. 1913); Shoemaker v. South
Bend Arrester Co., 135 Ind. 471, 35 N. E. 280 (1893). Judge Denison has said
that Emack v. Kane "has continued the leading case" on the power of the
Federal Courts to enjoin claims of infringement. Oil Conservation Engineering
Co., v. Brooks Engineering Co., 52 F. (2d) 783 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931).
'
4Gerosa v. Apco Mfg. CO., 299 Fed. i9 (C. C. A. ist, 1924); Alliance Securities
Co. v. De Vilbiss, 24F. (2d) 530 (N. D. Ohio 1928).
1,133 Misc. 213,232 N. Y. Supp. 245 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
16225 App. Div. 860, 233 N. Y. Supp. 845 (Ist Dept. 1929) (memorandum
opinion). .17Supra note 4.
18Supra note 15 at 214, 232 N. Y. Supp. 245, 246 (1928).
29See Pound, supra note i at 668.
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Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co.,2 0 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals said: "As a general rule, a court of equity will not enjoin the
publication of a libel in the absence of facts of conspiracy * * * but
where there is widespread propaganda, indicating a well-founded
plan, skillfully disseminated throughout the land to intimidate cus-
tomers and coerce them, to frighten dealers so as to cause them to cease
representing another, equity will, because of such intimidation,
coercion and conspiracy, take jurisdiction and afford adequate and
full relief."2 1
The Maytag case is cited in Dehydro v. Tretolite,22 a suit to restrain
circulation of letters among the complainant's customers, and oral
statements to such customers that complainant's compound in-
fringed patents owned and controlled by the defdndant and that com-
plainant's customers would render themselves liable in damages if
they used complainant's compound. The Court referred to the "well-
established rule, in the absence of a statutory authority, that the
courts are without jurisdiction to enjoin a libel or slander", citing
Kidd v. Horry, supra, and similar cases but overruled a motion to dis-
miss, on the ground that this was not an action to enjoin a libel or
slander. "Where the gravamen in the action is to enjoin unfair com-
petition, the question of libel and slander is only incidental to the
action, and such an action is not one to enjoin a libel or slander." A
motion to dismiss was denied.
There are indications that the courts in the United States, both
state and federal, are likely to overrule the early precedents as to
equitable jurisdiction over disparagement of a cdmpetitior's goods, or,
at least, to ignore them. The argument that injunctive relief must be
2035 F. (2d) 403 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929), Lindley, J., certiorari denied, 281 U. S.
737 (193o).2lSupra note 20 at 408, citing Hicks v. National Sales Ass'n., i F. (2d) 963
(C. C. A. 7th, 1927); Farquhar v. National Harrow Co., supra note 13; Adriance,
Platt & Co. v. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1903); Emack v.
Kane, supra note 13. In the Maytag case, a final decree was entered and upon
appeal was affirmed (with a reduction of the judgment). Maytag Co. v. Meadows
Mfg. Co., 45 F. (2d) 299 (C. C. A. 7th, x93i).
253 F. (2d) 273 (N. D. Okla. 1931). See also Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-
Am. Pub. Co., 245 Mass. 262, 139 N. E. 655 (1923). Suit was brought against a
newspaper and the wrong was "interference with plaintiff's business," rather than
unfair competition. The defendants were charged with having sought to persuade
and induce depositors to boycott the plaintiff because its methods of business
and financial results appearing in its statements and returns, when compared
with other trust companies inferentially showed incompetent management." It
was held that the court had jurisdiction to maintain a bill to enjoin similar publi-
cations.
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denied in such cases on constitutional grounds,23 no longer is seriously
advanced, nor does it find support.2 Few of the more recent cases in
which the old precedents have been cited and followed, and the old
rule again laid down, are actions between competitors. For instance,
in Willis v. O'Connell,2 plaintiff sold a proprietary medicine and de-
fendant published a newspaper. Though the opinion tends to support
the narrow rule as to equity's jurisdiction over trade libels, the case is
not authoritative on disparagement of competing goods. As the
Alabama District Court fairly pointed out, it did not involve unfair
competition in trade.26 Robert E. Hicks Corporation v. National
Salesmen's Training Associatiof,27 was a suit brought by the pro-
prietor of a correspondence school for salesmanship against a maga-
zine publisher. The plaintiff's activities included publication of a
magazine, and defendant's magazines included one devoted to sales-
manship; still, the libelous statements with which defendant was
charged, 28 were "mere libels" rather than unfair acts directed against
nSee Citizens Light Heat & P. Co. v. Montgomery, 171 Fed. 553 (N. D. Ala.
1909).
24In Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission, 13 F. (2d) 673
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926), Stone, J. said (p. 686): "It is true that there was no juris-
diction in equity to enjoin publication of a libel (Francis v. Flinn, 118 U. S. 385,
6 Sup. Ct. 1148 (1886)), but this was not because of constitutional reasons and
such jurisdiction might be conferred by statute", citing Am. Malting Co. v.
Keitel, 209 Fed. 351 (C. C. A. 2d, i913).
It has been suggested, in this connection, that "The position that the consti-
tutional provision prohibits previous restraint in all cases of tortious writing or
speaking would preclude relief in many cases where equity, however, will enjoin
publications which it conceives are incidental to the attempted infringement of
property rights." Note in (r916) 30 HARv. L. REv. 172, 173. Lawrence, how-
ever, (EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1929), Vol. II, p. 919) still refers to the consti-
tutional guarantee of the right of free speech as being "generally * * * held to
preclude this jurisdiction, on grounds of public policy, though the concurrence of
other independent grounds of relief may confer the jurisdiction."
25231 Fed. ioo4 (S. D. Ala. i916).
26Supra note 24, see p. 1014 of the opinion: "I think it not unfair to say that the
cases cited and relied upon by the plaintiff, as a general proposition, may be
divided into three classes. (I) Where patent rights were infringed; (2) Where
lawful violence was threatened and imminent; and (3) Where unfair and illegal
methods were resorted to by competitors in trade. Of course, this case does not
involve the infringement of a patent, or any threatened unlawful violence, or any
unfair competition in trade."
271g F. (2d) 963 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
21The statements published by the defendant, as restated by the Court, were:
"Salesmanship cannot be taught by means of correspondence; success cannot be
sold and delivered like a commodity; appellee advertises, not in express terms,
but by implication, that it can and will procure lucrative employment for its
students, and this service is offered as an inducement to prospective students to
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a competitor. In this case the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
acknowledged the old rule,20 but the case is too near the border line
between "mere libel" and unfair competition to be a formidable
authority against equitable protection from disparagement of
goods.30
Finally, the two New York cases, Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith,31 and
Old Investors & Traders Corporation v. Jenkins,32 while they do not
directly overrule the earlier decisions, may well be held to have taken
out of the old rule cases involving competitors and those contributing
to disparagement of a competitor's goods.33
The need for relief of this kind has been recognized by legal corn-
take this course in salesmanship, and thus it undertakes to sell success; it does not
procure such positions, and hence it does not deliver what it sells; it is selling a
gold brick; such advertisements are dishonest and fraudulent; the persons using
them are confidence destroyers, thieves, mail order crooks, direct selling jackals,
frauds, crooks, vermin; they are taking money under false pretenses, and trading
their honesty and their decency for dollars; their methods are thieving contracts
and schemes," etc. supra note 27, at 964.
29Supra note 27, at 964. "The general rule is that a court of equity will not
enjoin the publication of a libel. The operation of the rule is not affected by the
fact that the false statements may injure the plaintiff in his business or as to his
property, in the absence of acts of conspiracy, intimidation, or coercion."
3*See Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., supra note 20, in the same court, in
which the Hicks case is cited.
Two recent decisions in actions between actual competitors follow directly and
unqualifiedly the early cases on enjoining threats and unfounded claims. Oil
Conservation Engineering Co. v. Brooks Engineering Co., supra note 13, was
brought on the theory that defendant's threats of infringement suits and claims,
involving both patents and trademarks, constituted unfair competition. The
District Court granted an injunction, and dismissed counterclaims for patent and
trademark infringement. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision
on the main bill, saying (pp. 785, 786) that defendant's notices to competitors,
and similar accounts, were in good faith. "If not well based, they are in the
nature of libels or slanders of title; possibly they are analogous to a cloud upon
the competitor's title to his business and to his output. A court of equity has no
jurisdiction to enjoin a mere slander or libel.. See American Malting Co. v.
Keitel, supra note 24; Kidd v. Horry, supra note 6. It is only when such slanders
are both in bad faith-that is, malicious-and are working destruction of property
or property rights, that equity will interfere; otherwise the remedy is it law."
Citing Emack v. Kane, supra note 13, as the leading case on the subject, the court
then says that "bad faith and malice must appear before any such power ex-
ists.... There have been, in recent years, occasional reported opinions which
seem somewhat to disregard this essential basis; but in so far as they may bear that
construction, we cannot think they are well decided."
3t224 App. Div. 187, 229 N. Y. Supp. 692 (4th Dept. 1928).
32133 Misc. 213, 232 N. Y. Supp. 245 (1928).
33See Old Investors and Traders Corporation v. Jenkins, supra note 32, where a
non-competing publisher of a trade libel was enjoined.
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mentators in the past, and continues to be acknowledged. In
England it has been granted for many years-a natural development
in the Chancery Courts. Commonly, however, this has been at-
tributed to the Judicature Act of 1873,", and has come to be classified
as a statutory remedy." It has been suggested that the American
courts are moving, or should move in the same direction.37 It should
be noted, however, that the English courts, treating these cases of dis-
paragement as libel cases, subject, nevertheless, to injunction, have
required proof of special damage before granting either legal or
equitable relief.38 Trade libels are not libelous per se.31
Neither legislation similar to the English statute, nor a reversal of
the precedents against enjoining libels, promises complete relief from
commercial abuses of this nature. A more nearly adequate solution
is to be found in the law of unfair competition. A statement about a
competitor's goods which is untrue or misleading, and which is made
to influence, or tends to influence the public not to buy, certainly is
not a method of competition which honorable merchants can counte-
nance. Prompt relief against competition of this sort, often vital to
protect property and good-will, can be given only by injunction.
This is the direction in which our courts seem to be moving.
14See Dean Pound's article, supra note i, at 668; CLARK, PRINCIPLES Op EQUITY
(i919) says of "Disparagement of Property" (Sec. 238): "There is no plausible
reason why equity should not give injunctive relief since only rights of property
and not of personality are involved. The strong tendency in this country, how-
ever, has been to refuse relief, due largely to confusing the subject with that of dis-
paragement of character." See also an article, Jurisdiction of .E8uity over Libels
Affecting Trade, (1926) 75 U. oF PA. L. REV. 258. C. R. Jonas, Disparagement of
Goods as Trade iLbel, (197) 6 N. C. L. Rtv. 72, writes: " * * The modem Amei-
can decisions, while not so outspoken as the English authorities, are awake to the
danger of their position and, whenever some recognized equitable principle is in-
volved, * * * they are granting the relief necessary. Probably it is safe to say,
from the recent trend of decisions on this subject in this country, that some court
will soon take advantage of the opportunity here presented to discard this in-
direct and unsatisfactory approach and blaze a trail direct to the heart of this
problem." u36 & 37 VICT. c. 66, 816. 32 C. J. 272.
37Dean Pound, supra note I at 668. See also, editorial comment in (1920) 20
COL. L. REv. 796.
38 See Alcott v. Millar's Karri, etc., 91 L. T. Rep. 722, (1905). In a comment on
this case it was said, 167 Law Times 24 (I929), "in addition to having to show
that a statement was false and that it Was published maliciously a plaintiff must
prove thathe has suffered special damage. Unless he has suffered such loss, which
can be and is specified by him, he had better avoid all litigation andignore the dis-
paraging remarks altogether."
39Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 637 (1830); LeMassena v. Storm, 62 App.
Div. I50,7o N. Y. Supp. 882 (I9OI); Bozntonv. Shaw Stocking Co., 146Mass. 219,
15 N. E. 507 (1888); Victor Safe & Lock Co. v. Deright, 147 Fed. 211 (C. C. A.
8th, x9o6).
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Attempts to restrain disparagement of a competitor's goods
through action by the Federal Trade Commission offer no adequate
solution of the problem here presented. They do show, however, the
existence of a growing feeling that the use of false and defamatory
statements is not a fair method of competition. If this sentiment
develops, it will soon be reflected in decisions of equity courts in
unfair competition cases. In the Commission these complaints have
resulted in Trade Practice Conference Rules, in stipulations entered
into with the Commission, and in orders of the Commission, only a
few of which have reached the Courts.40
4'0 n 1924 an order that a manufacturer of hydrogen peroxide "cease and desist
from directly or indirectly publishing, circulating or causing to be published or
circulated, any false, deceptive, or misleading statements of or concerning the
product of a competitor, and particularly from publishing, circulating, or causing
to be published or circulated, directly or indirectly, such statements concerning
the product 'Daxol' manufactured by the Proper Antiseptic Laboratories of Cin-
cinnati, Ohio, ***.", came before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and was reversed on the ground that the product for whose special pro-
tection the order was issued, was misbranded and was labeled to be used for pur-
poses for which it was unfit, and that the public had no interest in the protection
of such an article. John Bene & Sons v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 Fed.
468 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924). In 1928 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, reviewed an order which prohibited a number of allegedly unfair acts in-
cluding the circulating of false statements concerning the abilities of a competitor
to fill orders, the adaptability of the competitor's product for its intended use and
as to the competitor's financial standing and business methods. Philip Carey
Mfg. v. Federal Trade Commission, 29 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928). The order
was reversed on the ground that the evidence was insufficient, Judge Moorman
saying (p. 5 1): " * * the evidence shows that petitioners, not only did not author-
ize their salesmen to disparage the products of their competitors, but expressly
instructed them not to do so. Their policy, as disclosed in the evidence, was to
sell their product on its merits and not on the demerits of other I ke products.
Proof that a salesman here and there out of many-as many as 600 at one time-
spoke disparagingly of the product of a competitor (not more than a dozen times
in all) does not amount to substantial evidence of an unfair method of compe-
tition." Another such order, namely, "From publishing or causing to be pub-
lished, directly or indirectly, adverse, disparaging or derogatory interviews, ex-
pressions, opinions, statements or comments regarding the nature, ingredients,
composition or effect of its competitors' baking powders, concealing or with-
holding respondent's connection with or interest in such publication thereof, and
causing such expressions, opinions, statements or comments to seem to be either
anonymous and therefore disinterested, or the voluntary interviews or contri-
butions of disinterested and technically qualified authorities or persons acting
only in the public interest, or to be mere news items or the ordinary and usual
record of current events published only as matters of public interest, not in-
spired by nor published for the use and benefit of, or by procurement of, re-
spondent.", came before the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in
Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 32 F. (2d) 966 (1929),
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but not on the issue of the power of the Commission to restrain trade defamation.
Subsequently, the Royal Baking Powder Company consented to an injunction
restraining these acts. There was no trial.
A considerable number of industries which have held Trade Practice Con-
ferences have included among those rules which are approved by the Federal
Trade Commission and accepted by the Commission as legally enforceable, a rule
usually reading substantially thus: "The defamation of competitors by falsely
imputing to them dishonorable conduct, inability to perform contracts, question-
able credit standing, or by other false representations, or the false disparagement
of the grade or quality of their goods, with the tendency and capacity to mis-
lead or deceive purchasers or prospective purchasers, is an unfair trade practice."
